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MANSON v. BRATHWAITE REVISITED:
TOWARDS A NEW RULE OF DECISION FOR
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Timothy P. O’Toole* and Giovanna Shay**
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost 30 years ago, in Manson v. Brathwaite,1 the Supreme Court set
out a test for determining when due process requires suppression of an
out-of-court identification produced by suggestive police procedures.
The Manson Court rejected a per se exclusion rule in favor of a test
focusing on whether an identification infected by suggestive procedures
is nonetheless reliable when judged in the totality of the circumstances.2
The purpose of this Article is two-fold: to demonstrate that the Manson
rule of decision fails to safeguard due process values, in part because it
does not account for the intervening social science research, and to
initiate a conversation about how a more effective rule of decision could
be constructed.
To use the vocabulary introduced by Professor Mitchell Berman and
employed by Professor Kermit Roosevelt, the Manson Court identified
both an operative constitutional proposition and a rule of decision for
due process challenges to identification procedures.3 The operative
constitutional proposition identified by the Manson Court was that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “fairness” in
identification procedures, and, specifically, “reliability.”4 “[R]eliability is
the linchpin,” Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court.5 The Manson rule of
decision thus provides that, even if a procedure is determined to be
unnecessarily suggestive, results will nonetheless be admitted if they are
deemed reliable based on five factors: “the opportunity of the witness to
Chief, Special Litigation Division, Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia.
**
Robert M. Cover Clinical Teaching Fellow, Yale Law School.
1
432 U.S. 98 (1977).
2
Id. at 113-14.
3
Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2004). See also Meir
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984); Richard H. Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1305-06 (2006); Kermit Roosevelt,
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1653 (2005).
4
432 U.S. at 113.
5
Id. at 114.
*
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view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’s degree of
attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level
of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the
crime and the confrontation.”6
Sadly, the rule of decision set out in Manson has failed to meet the
Court’s objective of furthering fairness and reliability. The results have
been tragic. Since 1989, 340 people have been exonerated in the United
States after having previously been convicted by juries of serious crimes.7
Media reports of exonerations have now become commonplace.8
Mistaken eyewitness identification was a leading cause of these
wrongful convictions, by one estimate accounting for 88% of the
erroneous rape convictions and 50% of the false murder convictions.9
The Department of Justice has issued a report analyzing twenty-eight
DNA exonerations and concluded that inaccurate eyewitness testimony
was “the most compelling evidence” in the majority of these cases.10
Questions have been raised about whether Texas executed an innocent
teenager, Ruben Cantu, in 1993, after police allegedly pressured the only
eyewitness, an illegal immigrant who was shown Cantu’s photograph

Id.
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005). See also Michael L. Radelet, William S. Lofquist & Hugo
Adam Bedau, Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their
Guilt, 13 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 907, 916 (1996) (describing 68 cases of death row
inmates “later released because of doubts about their guilt”).
8
See BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 275-76 (2001);
LOLA VOLLEN & DAVE EGGERS, SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED
AND EXECUTED (2005). See, e.g., John M. Broder, Starting Over, 24 Years After a Wrongful
Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at A13; David Firestone, DNA Test Brings Freedom, 16
Years After Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at A22; Colin Garrett, Another DNA
Exoneration, Another Death Row Inmate Freed, 28 CHAMPION 47 (2004); Adam Liptak, Houston
DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, and Ripples in Texas Could Be Vast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2003, at A14; Barbara Novovitch, Free After 17 Years for a Rape that He Did Not Commit, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at A22.
9
Gross et al., supra note 7, at 544. See Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful
Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337 (2006)
(discussing the role that mistaken eyewitness identification played in the wrongful
conviction of David Wong and potential reforms to eyewitness identification procedures
generally); Arnold H. Loewy, Systemic Changes that Could Reduce the Conviction of the
Innocent 4-5 (Aug. 30, 2006) UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 927223, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927223.
10
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL 28 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L
INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE].
6
7
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repeatedly, to identify the boy.11 Even the “blue” state of Connecticut
has been affected: earlier this year, James Tillman was exonerated by
DNA evidence in a 1988 sexual assault case based on eyewitness
identification.12
The Ronald Cotton case, a DNA exoneration, provides a particularly
compelling example of the dangers of mistaken identification. In the
early morning hours of July 29, 1984, an intruder sexually assaulted a
college student named Jennifer Thompson in her North Carolina home.13
Two days later, Ms. Thompson viewed a photo array containing six
pictures, one of them of a man named Ronald Cotton.14 Ms. Thompson
initially chose two pictures from the array, including Cotton’s photo.15
She examined these two pictures and told police that Cotton’s photo
“looks most like” the assailant.16 About a week later, Ms. Thompson
viewed a live line-up in which Cotton was the only participant whose
picture also had been in the photo array.17 Ms. Thompson was told to
pick the man who looked the most like her assailant.18 She told police
that she was deciding between participants numbers four and five, but
stated that number five “looks the most like him.”19 In 1986, Ms.
Thompson testified at trial, and again identified Mr. Cotton, who was
convicted.20 Describing these events years later, Ms. Thompson said, “I
knew this was the man. I was completely confident. I was sure.”21 In
1987, Ms. Thompson again identified Mr. Cotton when he was granted a
new trial.22 At the retrial, she told authorities that she had never seen
another man, Bobby Poole, who claimed to be her attacker.23 Eleven
years after Ms. Thompson’s first identification, in 1995, Ronald Cotton
11
Lise Olsen, The Cantu Case: Death and Doubt. Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?
Eyewitness Says He Felt Influenced by Police to ID the Teen as the Killer, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Nov. 20, 2005, at A1.
12
Matt Burgard, His Challenge Now: Freedom (Wrongly Convicted, Tillman is Formally
Exonerated), HARTFORD COURANT, July 12, 2006, at A1; Matt Burgard & Elizabeth
Hamilton, Dogged Pursuit Freed Inmate: Lawyers Kept Up Hunt Until Finding Key DNA,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 11, 2006, at A1; Lisa Siegel, Connecticut Innocence Project
Discovers Wrongful Conviction, CONN. L. TRIB., June 6, 2006.
13
State v. Cotton, 394 S.E.2d 456, 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
14
Id. at 461 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Jennifer Thompson, I Was Certain, But I Was Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2000, at D15.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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was exonerated by DNA evidence.24 DNA testing demonstrated that
Bobby Poole—who ultimately pled guilty to the rape of Jennifer
Thompson—was the real culprit.25 Writing years after the exoneration,
Jennifer Thompson said, “I live with constant anguish that my profound
mistake cost [Mr. Cotton] so dearly.”26
Exonerations like Ronald Cotton’s have illustrated what many have
long suspected: eyewitnesses make mistakes in identifying strangers.27
Of course, there are no doubt many more cases in which innocent people
were convicted based on faulty eyewitness identification, but never
exonerated. For obvious reasons, DNA exonerations are more common
in crimes involving sexual assault than in, for example, shootings or
purse-snatchings.28 And due to scarce resources, usually only the most
serious convictions are afforded the level of scrutiny that can produce a
conclusive exoneration. Nonetheless, even an under-reported rate of
exonerations suggests that protections designed to vet the reliability of
eyewitness identification evidence—and of most interest here the
Manson due process test—are not up to the task.29
The most obvious problem with the Manson rule is that the factors it
sets out have proven not to be good indicators of reliability. Indeed,
Manson is a prime example of Professor Kermit Roosevelt’s observation
that, “decision rules that made sense when adopted may lose their fit.”30
During the past three decades, and at an increasing pace over the past
ten to fifteen years, research has demonstrated that some of the Manson
reliability factors can be skewed by faulty police practices, and that the

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 8, at XV.
29
The most recent experience in Virginia shows the number of wrongful convictions
produced by eyewitness identifications may be substantial. In 2004, Governor Mark
Warner ordered scientists to conduct DNA testing on a small, randomly selected
percentage of sexual assault cases tried between 1973 and 1988 to determine if more
widespread DNA testing of the hundreds of convictions obtained during that time would
be warranted. Of the thirty-one cases reviewed, two exonerations occurred. In other
words, 6% of the randomly sampled cases tested resulted in exonerations. Predictably,
both Virginia exonerations involved convictions that relied heavily on eyewitness
testimony. See Michael D. Shear & Jamie Stockwell, DNA Tests Exonerate 2 Former Prisoners,
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at A01.
30
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1686-87.
24
25
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list as a whole is substantially incomplete.31 Psychologists, including
Gary L. Wells, Elizabeth Loftus, Brian Cutler, Steven Penrod, and others,
have conducted studies demonstrating that human memory for
strangers’ faces is fallible and identifying the circumstances in which
people’s ability to remember strangers’ faces is particularly prone to
error.32 In fact, studies indicate that: eyewitnesses are vulnerable to
suggestion;33 their confidence in their picks is not necessarily strongly
correlated with their accuracy;34 and their confidence level is malleable
and can be infected by suggestive procedures.35
The problem with the Manson rule of decision, however, runs even
deeper than any issues with individual reliability factors. The Manson
factors have become reduced to a checklist to determine reliability, and a
checklist is a poor means of making a subtle, fact-intensive, and casespecific determination as to whether a given eyewitness identification is
reliable, despite the use of suggestive police procedures. Even if an
eyewitness identification meets all five of the Manson factors, it may still
prove to be unreliable for reasons that the Manson Court could not have
imagined. Yet, because the Court has decreed a litmus test—or at least
because the lower courts have read the Court’s decree that way—the
unreliable identification will be admitted. Indeed, the Manson factors
have been reified. As described below in Part IV, in the minds of many
courts, it appears that there can be no due process problem if a number
of these factors can be gleaned from the record. This mode of operating
is akin to the phenomenon of “constitutional calcification” described by
Professor Roosevelt: an outmoded rule of decision is mistaken for a
constitutional operative proposition.36

31
Gary Wells, What is Wrong With the Manson v. Brathwaite Test of Eyewitness
Identification Accuracy?, www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/homepage.htm (last
visited Aug. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Wells, What is Wrong].
32
See Gary Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, 29 CHAMPION 12
(2005) [hereinafter Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence] (surveying the psychological
literature in this area); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 277 (2003).
33
See Bill Nettles, Zoe Sanders Nettles & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: “I Notice
You Paused on Number Three,” 20 CHAMPION 10, 11 (1996).
34
See Gary L. Wells, Elizabeth A. Olson & Steve D. Charman, The Confidence of
Eyewitnesses in Their Identifications from Lineups, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 151,
151 (2002).
35
See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360,
360 (1998).
36
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1692-93.
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Criticism of the Manson rule has come from many quarters and taken
varied forms. For years, psychologists have attempted to make their
research findings known to the legal and criminal justice communities,
and to change police procedures.37 Naturally, defense attorneys also
have sought to use this research to their best advantage, attempting to
get experts admitted to discuss the failings of eyewitness identification,
or to have juries instructed that eyewitnesses can be mistaken.38
Legal commentators have criticized the Manson test as a poor way of
determining which identifications should be excluded at trial on grounds
of unreliability.39 Some have suggested that the Court adopt a rule of
per se exclusion of identifications that are the product of suggestive
police procedures,40 loosen the standards for admitting expert testimony
on eyewitness identification,41 require corroboration for eyewitness
37
See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of
Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 581 (2000) (documenting collaboration of the
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence that resulted in the 1999 National
Institute of Justice report, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement); Wells,
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, supra note 32; Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification
Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 618
(1998) [hereinafter Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures]; Gary L. Wells, Police
Lineups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 791 (2001).
38
See, e.g., Lisa Steele, Trying Identification Cases: An Outline for Raising Eyewitness ID
Issues, 28 CHAMPION 8 (2004).
39
Suzannah B. Gambell, The Need To Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing
Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189 (2006); Steven P. Grossman,
Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court’s Due Process Test Fails To Meet Its Own Criteria,
11 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 58 (1981); David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection:
A Proposal To Return to the Wade Trilogy’s Standard, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 605 (1987);
Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial
Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 275 (1991); Ruth Yacona,
Manson v. Brathwaite: The Supreme Court’s Misunderstanding of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (2006); Keith Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases 347-48 (June 2006), University of Wisconsin Law School
Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 1023, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
911240.
40
Paseltiner, supra note 39, at 605; Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 306, 314; Yacona, supra
note 39, at 595-60. See also Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act
Won’t—Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identification, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 264
(2002).
41
Robert J. Hallisey, Experts on Eyewitness Testimony in Court—A Short Historical
Perspective, 39 HOW. L.J. 237, 238 (1995); Connie Mayer, Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness
Identification Based on Pretrial Photographic Arrays, 13 PACE L. REV. 815, 859 (1994);
Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 310; Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to
the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93 (1992); Cindy T. O’Hagan, Note,
When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 755
(1993); David M. Shofi, Comment, The New York Courts’ Lack of Direction and Discretion
Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Identification Testimony, 13 PACE L. REV. 1101, 1132
(1994).
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identifications in some circumstances,42 or mandate certain police
procedures.43
Some state courts have attempted to respond to the criticism of
Manson by interpreting their state constitution or other state law to
provide more protection than Manson. Utah and Kansas have adopted a
refined version of the Manson test on state law grounds, using reliability
factors that have a firmer grounding in the social science.44 New York
and Massachusetts require the automatic suppression of unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedures.45 Wisconsin requires suppression
of show-up identifications, in which a single suspect is presented to the
witness, unless the use of the procedure was necessary under the
circumstances.46 Citing the Dubose decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has recently indicated a willingness to consider a state
constitutional claim based on the psychological research if a record is
made in the trial court.47
State courts have also attempted to mitigate the effects of Manson
through other measures, like special jury instructions. The Connecticut
Supreme Court recently used its supervisory authority to mandate a
special jury instruction in cases that the police failed to inform the
witness that the suspect might not be present in the photo array or lineup.48 The Georgia Supreme Court has directed that trial courts should
no longer instruct jurors to consider the eyewitness’s confidence in
evaluating his identification.49 New Jersey has mandated a special
instruction on cross-racial identification in some cases.50 Most recently,

42
See, e.g., Radha Natarjan, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to
Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1845-48 (2003).
43
See, e.g., Jake Sussman, Suspect Choices: Lineup Procedures and the Abdication of Judicial
Authority, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 507, 508 (2001-02).
44
State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 577 (Kan. 2003); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780-81
(Utah 1991).
45
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams, 423
N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981).
46
See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 596-97 (Wis. 2005).
47
State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 180-81 (N.J. 2006).
48
See, e.g., State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290 (Conn. 2005) (rejecting Defendant’s claim that
Connecticut Constitution required abandonment of Biggers factors and instead mandating
that, in situations in which line-up administrator failed to instruct witness that suspect may
not be present in the line-up, trial court charge jury regarding the risk of misidentification).
49
See, e.g., Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005) (recognizing that it is error for
trial courts to instruct jurors to consider a witness’s confidence in evaluating the credibility
of their identification).
50
State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999) (“A cross-racial instruction should be
given only when, as in the present case, identification is a critical issue in the case, and an
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the New Jersey Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority to
mandate that law enforcement officers make a written record
documenting the out-of-court identification procedure, “including the
place where the procedure was conducted, the dialogue between the
witness and the interlocutor, and the results.”51
In recent years, local legislatures and law enforcement agencies have
made efforts to improve identification procedures. The National
Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has
published a report on DNA exonerations52 and two guides on protocols
for conducting eyewitness identifications.53 States, including New
Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin, and cities, including Seattle and
Minneapolis, have adopted police procedures for line-ups based on best
practices from psychological literature.54 Despite all of the criticism and
reform efforts, however, the nation’s highest Court has yet to confront
the need to overhaul Manson’s outdated rule. Advocates are increasingly
calling on the Court to do just that.55 This Article attempts to
demonstrate that Manson must be revisited, and to open a conversation
about what rule of decision would best further the operative
constitutional propositions of “fairness” and “reliability” identified by
the Manson Court.
Any new rule of decision should, as Professors Meares and Harcourt
have argued, take account of the considerable social science research in

eyewitness’s cross-racial identification is not corroborated by other evidence giving it
independent reliability.”).
51
State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 897 (N.J. 2006).
52
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE, supra note 10.
53
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf.
54
Karin Brulliard, Revamping Virginia’s Police Lineups, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at C01;
Gina Kim, Police Lineups’ Flaws Spur New Approach, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2005, at CN1; Gina
Kolata & Iver Peterson, New Jersey Is Trying New Way for Witnesses To Say, “It’s Him,” N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A1. See also Scott Ehlers, Eyewitness Identification: State Law Reform,
29 CHAMPION 34 (2005) (surveying state legislative reform efforts); Gary L. Wells,
Eyewitness Identification: Systematic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615 (2006) [hereinafter Wells,
Systematic Reforms].
55
The authors are aware of at least two cert petitions filed this year asking the United
States Supreme Court to reexamine Manson. See Perez v. United States, No. 05-596, 2005
WL 3038542 (Nov. 10, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1464 (2006) (arguing that the certainty
factor must be reconsidered in light of psychological research and state courts’ rejections of
it); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290 (Conn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1798 (2006).
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this area.56 How should such a rule be constructed? The new rule
should provide affirmative minimum guidelines for the conduct of
identification procedures—what some term “prophylactic rules.”
Professor Susan Klein has argued that eyewitness identification
procedures are a “prime candidate” for the implementation of
prophylactic rules.57 Such rules would provide clear guidance to law
enforcement and easily administrable tests for trial courts. Moreover, as
Professor Klein has pointed out, affirmative minimum guidelines would
improve eyewitness identification procedures, and reduce the likelihood
of mistaken identification.58
Prophylactic rules are particularly helpful in a situation in which
case-by-case adjudication is unwieldy. The classic example is the
Supreme Court’s Miranda decision. Numerous commentators have noted
that Miranda replaced an unmanageably fact-intensive voluntariness
decision with clear rules.59 Because it requires case-by-case reliability
determinations, the Manson rule of decision shares the weaknesses of the
pre-Miranda voluntariness regime—it is both resource-intensive and
poorly-suited to courts’ capacities. In much the same way that the
Miranda warnings have provided clear guidance, a rule of decision
instituting minimum affirmative guidelines for identification
procedures—based on the psychological research—would provide better
guidance for both police and trial courts.
Such guidelines could draw on the numerous models and
recommendations that have been issued about eyewitness identification
practices.60 They would require that police implement double-blind
procedures, use non-suspect fillers chosen to minimize suggestivity,
separate witnesses, caution witnesses that the culprit may not appear in
the line-up or photo array, avoid exposing the witness to multiple line-

56
Tracey L. Meares & Bernard Harcourt, Supreme Court Review: Transparent Adjudication
and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
733, 743, 797 (2000). In recent years the Court has demonstrated a willingness to consider
research findings in revisiting constitutional rules. Id. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 nn.23-24 (2002) (drawing on
psychological literature to determine that Eighth Amendment bars the execution of the
mentally retarded and juveniles).
57
Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1064-65 (2001).
58
Id.
59
Fallon, supra note 3, at 1305-06; Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1671-72; David A. Strauss,
The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 208-09 (1988).
60
See supra notes 37-54.
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up procedures with the same suspect, and ask witnesses to make a
statement of their certainty at the time they make a pick.
The proposed rule of decision permits continued innovation.
Professor Klein has pointed out that prophylactic rules may be changed
as social science evolves or state officials produce alternative solutions.61
Congress cannot “simply erase” prophylactic rules, Professor Roosevelt
has written, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of
Miranda in Dickerson.62 Nonetheless, legislatures and local governments
can experiment with alternative methods of safeguarding the
constitutional right at issue, provided they do not fall below the floor set
out by the prophylactic rule.63
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the problems with the
Manson rule of decision. In Part II, the psychological research that has
been conducted in the nearly three decades since Manson was decided is
outlined. Part III discusses the development of the Manson rule of
decision in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Part IV, the way that
Manson typifies what Professor Roosevelt described as the “poor fit”
between a constitutionally operative proposition and a rule of decision is
described.64 Finally, Part V returns to a more detailed defense of the
proposed solution—minimum affirmative guidelines for identification
procedures.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
In the time since the Supreme Court decided Manson, psychologists
have made great strides in understanding how people remember
strangers’ faces, and, specifically, some of the factors that cause mistaken
identifications. The fundamental problem is that human perception and
memory do not work like a video recorder—while a camera simply
stores information for later recall, human memory is both subjective and
malleable.65 Professor Wells has described eyewitness identification
evidence as a form of “trace evidence”; instead of leaving a physical
trace like blood stains or fingerprints, eyewitness evidence leaves a

Klein, supra note 57, at 1060.
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1672 (discussing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000)).
63
Id. at 1671-72.
64
Id. at 1692-93.
65
D.A. Louw & A. Venter, The Relationship Between Memory and the Recall of Specific
Details, 23 MED. & L. 625, 626 (2004).
61
62
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“memory trace” in the mind of the observer.66 The question is how to
extract this evidence without damaging it.67
Researchers have identified a number of sources of error in
eyewitness evidence. For example, psychologists have documented a
“relative judgment” dynamic affecting simultaneous lineups, which are
lineups in which all suspects are presented to the witness at the same
time.68 The relative-judgment process occurs when the witness selects
the member of the lineup who most resembles his or her memory of the
culprit, relative to the other members of the lineup.69 An experiment
using two photo spreads—one containing the culprit and one from
which the culprit was absent—demonstrated that once the culprit was
removed from the photo array, many witnesses simply picked another
person, presumably the one that they thought looked the most like the
culprit.70 It is for this reason that researchers have recommended
instructing witnesses that the culprit might not be present in the lineup,
a simple measure demonstrated in one experiment to reduce mistaken
identifications from 78% to 33%.71 Psychologists also have recommended
that law enforcement authorities use sequential lineups, in which the
witness is shown a series of suspects, one at a time, and asked to make a
decision about each one individually.72
Another problem that psychologists have documented in the context
of lineups and photo arrays is the “experimenter-expectancy” effect, in
which the person conducting the identification procedure—whether
consciously or unconsciously—directs the witness’s attention to the
suspect.73
In order to combat this problem, researchers have
recommended that law enforcement agencies implement “double-blind”
procedures for conducting lineups or photo arrays, in which the
detective conducting the identification procedure does not know which
person is the suspect.74 Psychologists point out that “double-blind”
Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 37, at 618.
Id.
68
Wells & Olson, supra note 32, at 279.
69
Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal
Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 768-69 (1995).
70
Id. at 770.
71
Id. at 769. See also Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 37, at 62829.
72
Wells & Seelau, supra note 69, at 772; Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures,
supra note 37, at 639.
73
Wells & Seelau, supra note 69, at 775-78.
74
Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 37, at 627; Wells & Olson,
Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 32, at 289.
66
67
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procedures are standard in scientific experiments, and that identification
procedures are properly considered a type of experiment.75
The relationship between an eyewitness’s confidence and his or her
accuracy—of great relevance to one of the Manson factors—has been the
subject of extensive research.76 The confidence-accuracy correlation
varies depending on the circumstances, but many studies indicate that,
even at its highest, it is fairly modest.77 Some studies indicate that, in
poor witnessing conditions, the correlation between confidence and
accuracy can be non-significant, or even negative.78 A recent study coauthored between Professor Gary Wells and Professor Neil Brewer
suggests that confidence statements made at the time of the identification
may be meaningful, but Professors Wells and Brewer caution that the
same is probably not true of confidence statements made in court. They
explain that the confidence statements in their study were “protected
from the biasing effects of any of the typical social influences that can . . .
operate between the time of making an identification and giving
testimony in the courtroom”79
This distinction is significant because the most troubling aspect of
eyewitness confidence is that it is highly malleable. For example,
seemingly innocuous confirmatory feedback to the witness from the
person conducting the line-up, (“Good, you got him!” or “You got the
right guy.”) has been demonstrated to increase confidence.80 Even
routine procedures can enhance confidence artificially: briefing the
witness about the types of questions to expect on cross-examination,81
questioning the witness repeatedly,82 or telling the witness that another
witness picked the same suspect.83 Unfortunately, many of these effects

Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 37, at 627.
See Neil Brewer, Amber Keast & Amanda Rishworth, The Confidence-Accuracy
Relationship in Eyewitness Identification: The Effects of Reflection and Disconfirmation on
Correlation and Calibration, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 44 (2002); S. Penrod & B. Cutler,
Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 817 (1995); Wells, Olson & Charman, supra note 34, at 151.
77
Wells, Olson & Charman, supra note 34, at 152.
78
Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything
About Their Relationship?, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 253 (1980).
79
Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Eyewitness
Identification: Effects of Lineup Instructions, Foil Similarity and Target-Absent Base Rates, 12 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: APPLIED 11 (2006).
80
Wells & Bradfield, supra note 35, at 374.
81
Penrod & Cutler, supra note 76, at 827.
82
Id.
83
Wells & Seelau, supra note 69, at 774-75.
75
76
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have been demonstrated to inflate the certainty of inaccurate witnesses
more than that of accurate witnesses.84
Most disturbing, post-identification feedback from the line-up
administrator not only inflates a witness’s certainty about her choice, but
also affects her perception of her opportunity to view the event.85 “For
example, confirming feedback has been shown to influence witnesses’
accounts of how much attention they paid to the face of a perpetrator,
how good their view was, and how well they thought they made out the
details of the perpetrator’s face.”86
A confirming-feedback remark not only inflates the
eyewitnesses’ recollections of how confident they were
at the time, it also leads them to report that they had a
better view of the culprit, that they could make out
details of the face, that they were able to easily and
quickly pick him out of a lineup, that his face just
“popped out” to them, that their memorial image of the
gunman is particularly clear, and that they are adept at
recognizing faces of strangers.87
The problems with the Manson rule of decision are fairly obvious in
light of the psychological research, and have been described by Professor
Gary Wells in a forthcoming article.88 Three of the five Manson factors—
the witness’s opportunity to view, the witness’s degree of attention, and
the witness’s level of certainty—are generally self-reported by the
witness, and self-reports of memory are “notoriously unreliable.”89 The
witness’s level of certainty is suspect because, as discussed above, the
confidence-accuracy correlation is weak.90 Moreover, the witness’s
assessment of her confidence, her opportunity to view, and her degree of

Amy L. Bradfield, Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Damaging Effect of
Confirming Feedback of the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 113, 118 (2002); Penrod & Cutler, supra note 76, at 827.
85
Carolyn Semmler, Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, Effects of Postidentification Feedback on
Eyewitness Identification and Nonidentification Confidence, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 334 (2004);
Wells & Bradfield, supra note 35, at 366.
86
Semmler, Brewer & Wells, supra note 85, at 335.
87
Wells & Bradfield, supra note 35, at 374.
88
Wells, What is Wrong, supra note 31.
89
Id.
90
Wells, Olson & Charman, supra note 34, at 152.
84
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attention may all be distorted by post-identification feedback from the
police, repeated questioning, or preparation to testify.91
Even more fundamentally, as Professor Wells pointed out, the
Manson inquiry is flawed because the suggestive nature of the police
procedures actually taints the reliability factors, thus undermining the
intended purpose of the second step of the analysis.92 In other words,
the factors that should provide an independent assurance that an
identification was not tainted by suggestive police procedures are
themselves infected by the suggestive identification methods. Put
another way, the Manson rule of decision is self-fulfilling.
III. THE MANSON RULE OF DECISION
How did the Court arrive at the Manson rule of decision with these
five factors that are now so problematic? In Manson, the Court adopted
what Professor Charles Pulaski termed in a prescient 1974 article a
“permissive construction of the due process test.”93 Manson constituted a
type of compromise—a step backward from the protections that the
Court had instituted in a trilogy of 1967 eyewitness identification
decisions.
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided three eyewitness identification
cases—United States v. Wade,94 Gilbert v. California,95 and Stovall v.
Denno.96 Wade instituted what some consider a type of prophylactic
rule,97 concluding that the Sixth Amendment entitled the defendant to
the assistance of counsel at a post-indictment line-up.98 In reaching this
conclusion, the Wade Court noted the “vagaries of eyewitness
identification”99 and the “potential for improper influence” at line-ups,100
concluding that the “presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice
Wells & Bradfield, supra note 35, at 367.
Id.
93
Charles A. Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy’s
Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1111 (1974).
94
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
95
388 U.S. 263 (1967).
96
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
97
Compare Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20, 23, 106-07 (1975) (categorizing the Wade rule as a
prophylactic rule), with Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question
of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 119-22 (1985) (arguing that Wade was
improperly categorized as prophylactic).
98
Wade, 388 U.S. at 237.
99
Id. at 228.
100
Id. at 233.
91
92
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and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial.”101 Citing Miranda, the
Wade Court noted that its decision was not meant to stifle reform of
identification procedures, and that it “‘in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it
intended to have this effect.’”102
In Wade and its companion case, Gilbert, the Supreme Court
addressed when the government could nonetheless introduce in-court
identifications despite earlier uncounseled out-of-court identifications by
the same witness. The Gilbert Court held that the government could only
introduce the in-court identifications if it demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that they “were based upon observations of the
suspect other than the lineup identification”103 (i.e., had an independent
source).104 Thus, if the prosecution could satisfy this hurdle, it could
elicit an in-court identification, even if it could not “bolster” the in-court
identification with evidence of a tainted out-of-court identification.105
In the final case of the Wade trilogy, Stovall v. Denno, the Supreme
Court said that the Wade rule was not retroactive. The Stovall Court
criticized a show-up identification procedure that was used in that case,
but concluded that, although suggestive, it did not constitute a violation
of due process based on the “totality of the circumstances,” in which “an
immediate hospital confrontation” between the critically-wounded
victim and the suspect was “imperative.”106
The following year, in Simmons v. United States, the Supreme Court
seemed to shift the Stovall formulation substantially.107 In considering
whether a photo identification procedure violated due process, the Court
cited Stovall for the proposition that the procedure there had not been
“unnecessary”—a description that seemed to accurately reflect Stovall’s
holding—but then went on to examine the circumstances surrounding
the identification itself, ultimately concluding that they “leave little room
for doubt that the identification of Simmons was correct.”108 As
Professor Pulaski has explained, the “reworded language of the Simmons
due process test . . . suggested a very different inquiry.”109 Instead of
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id. at 236.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 240.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
Pulaski, supra note 93, at 1101.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
Pulaski, supra note 93, at 1108.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968).
Pulaski, supra note 93, at 1108.
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focusing solely on the necessity and suggestivity of the procedures used
by police, the Court then asked the far broader question of how likely it
was that the eyewitness misidentified the defendant. The Simmons due
process test “attributed critical importance to the nature and extent of the
witness’s ability to observe the offender at the scene of the crime, a factor
Stovall did not consider.”110
Thus, as explained by Professor Pulaski, after Simmons, there existed
two competing versions of the due process test for eyewitness
identification. The “strict” construction as exemplified by Stovall
weighed the “suggestiveness of the proceeding against the necessity for
its use.”111 The “permissive” construction exemplified by Simmons
declined to deem suggestive procedures due process violations “if the
witness had an opportunity at the time of the crime to identify the
offender accurately.”112 The second, more permissive approach
conceived of the due process rule “as a protection against the admission
of unreliable evidence, rather than as a bar to the use of unreliable
procedures.”113
In 1972, in Neil v. Biggers, the Supreme Court adopted the permissive
construction of the due process case, at least with respect to pre-Stovall
cases.114 The Court reasoned that, since the offense and trial in Biggers
occurred prior to the Court’s decision in Stovall, deterrence of police
misconduct—one of the major rationales for the “strict” formulation—
was not an issue.115 The Biggers Court concluded that a show-up did not
violate due process if “under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the
identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was
suggestive.”116 The Court identified for the first time
the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood
of misidentification includ[ing] the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’
prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
Id.
Id. at 1113.
112
Id. at 1112.
113
Id.
114
409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
115
Id. at 199.
116
Id. See Pulaski, supra note 93, at 1116. “Since a major purpose of the strict test is to
deter police from arranging unnecessarily suggestive confrontations, the Court suggested
in Neil that no deterrent function would be served by applying a strict construction of the
Stovall rule to a pre-Stovall case.” Id.
110
111

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/2

O'Toole and Shay: Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision f

2006]

Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited

125

demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and
the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.117
Writing in 1974, between the Court’s decisions in Biggers and
Manson, Professor Pulaski warned that adopting the Biggers test for postStovall cases would “eliminate whatever incentives remained . . . to
adopt standardized regulations describing how the police should
conduct identification procedures.”118 “So long as the prosecution can
demonstrate that the witness had some opportunity to observe the
offender at the time of the crime,” he explained, “the witness can make
an in-court identification and can testify concerning the pretrial
identification regardless of the suggestiveness of the pretrial
proceedings.”119
The Manson v. Brathwaite case in 1977 represented the final gasp of
the pure suggestivity/necessity approach previously followed in Stovall.
In Manson, the Supreme Court weighed the suggestivity/necessity per se
rule of Stovall against the reliability/totality of the circumstances
approach of Simmons and Biggers and opted for a reliability-based
approach, holding that “reliability is the linchpin” in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall
confrontations.120 Manson concluded that “[t]he factors to be considered
are set out in Biggers.”121 Thus, the “permissive” construction of the Due
Process Clause—with its emphasis on overall reliability of the
identification, rather than on the impermissibly suggestive nature of the
procedures used—became the test for all out-of-court identification
challenges.
Four years after Manson, another decision of the Supreme Court
watered down the Manson reliability approach even more than Professor
Pulaski had feared. In Watkins v. Sowders, the Supreme Court said that a
defendant challenging the reliability of an identification produced by
unnecessarily suggestive procedures had no entitlement to a separate,
pretrial hearing to determine reliability.122 “[T]he proper evaluation of
evidence under the instructions of the trial judge is the very task our
system must assume juries can perform[,]” the Supreme Court wrote in
117
118
119
120
121
122

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
Pulaski, supra note 93, at 1120.
Id.
Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
Id.
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981).
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Watkins.123 “[T]he only duty of a jury in cases in which identification
evidence has been admitted will often be to assess the reliability of that
evidence[,]” the Court reasoned.124
Thus, under Watkins, the
determination of whether the witness had adequate opportunity to
observe the offender can be made by the jury. Therefore, the due process
analysis is nearly indistinguishable from a general credibility
determination, and the one real judicial check on the untethered use of
unreliable identifications that Manson had seemed to provide is
removed.
In his 1974 article, Professor Pulaski warned that the rule of decision
ultimately adopted in Manson would create incentives for trial courts to
admit identifications that were the product of suggestive procedures.
“The Neil [v. Biggers] decision suggests that the constitutionally
required quantum of evidence necessary to surmount due process
objections to identification confrontations is quite small[,]” he wrote.125
He continued, “[S]ome trial judges may very well conclude that finding
the ‘elemental facts’ in the defendant’s favor entails a relatively greater
risk of reversal on appeal than does finding those facts in favor of the
prosecution.”126 Sadly, thirty years of experience with the Manson rule of
decision has borne out Professor Pulaski’s prediction that the Biggers test
later adopted in Manson would “reduce[ ] the due process test to a handy
device by which courts can legitimately overlook suggestive
confrontations.”127
IV. THE “POOR FIT” BETWEEN THE MANSON RULE OF DECISION AND THE
OPERATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSITIONS OF FAIRNESS AND RELIABILITY
In this part, a number of lower court opinions are discussed to
demonstrate, again using Professor Roosevelt’s terms, the “poor fit” of
the Manson rule of decision with the constitutionally operative
propositions of fairness and reliability.128
These cases illustrate
numerous police actions that are unnecessarily suggestive: using showups, including a suspect’s photograph in repeated identification
procedures, questioning witnesses repeatedly, allowing witnesses to
remain together when making their picks, and otherwise suggesting by
comments or actions that the police believe the suspect to be the culprit.
123
124
125
126
127
128
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Many of these suggestive procedures could have been avoided by
simply implementing double-blind procedures.
The point here, however, is not merely to provide examples of police
missteps. It is to illustrate that the Manson rule of decision fails to achieve
the purpose of furthering fairness and reliability because many of the socalled reliability factors are not good proxies for accuracy (for example,
subjective statements of certainty), because suggestive police procedures
can infect the factors that allegedly guarantee reliability, and because an
overall reliability determination cannot be made effectively by picking
out certain factors in isolation. In a world in which a determination of
reliability based on the totality of the circumstances is costly, many
courts are applying Manson in a way that is rote and mechanistic.
A. Federal Court Decisions
In United States v. Wong, a case involving the prosecution of a Green
Dragon gang member in a restaurant shooting, the Second Circuit
concluded that an identification was reliable despite the fact that the
witness had seen the shooter for only a few seconds as she ducked under
the table, and later expressed doubts.129 The witness in Wong viewed
three photo arrays and picked Wong out of the third array, saying the
photo “looked like the shooter.”130 At the first lineup, the witness
indicated that the defendant “looked like him” but that she couldn’t be
sure “because of the height.” At that point, the detectives told her, “we
can’t just take a ‘possibly,’” and dimmed the lights, ostensibly to make
the lighting more like the lighting in the restaurant.131 The witness then
identified Wong, although she said he was “taller than she remembered
the gunman to be.”132 Despite the witness’s clear inability to identify the
shooter without substantial coaching and the detectives’ having
repeatedly communicated their belief to the witness that they had the
right man, the Second Circuit concluded that the detectives’ actions had
not rendered the lineup impermissibly suggestive, and that, even if they
had, the identification was nonetheless reliable because the witness
“observed the gunman after she ducked under the table at the
restaurant, staring him in the face for ‘two to three seconds’ before he
turned away.”133

129
130
131
132
133

40 F.3d 1347, 1360 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1358.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1360.
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In Clark v. Caspari,134 the Eighth Circuit found reliable identifications
by two liquor store clerks who had viewed the two handcuffed AfricanAmerican suspects “surrounded by white police officers, one of whom
was holding a shotgun.”135 The Court focused on three factors: both
clerks had come face-to-face with the robbers during the robbery; only
thirty minutes had elapsed between robbery and show-up; and the
police had refrained from saying anything expressly suggestive to the
witnesses at the show-up.136 “Although the record reveals that the police
may have made several inquiries about the identity of the suspects
before receiving a positive identification,” the Court wrote, “there is no
evidence to suggest that their questions were designed to elicit a
particular response.”137 Thus, despite classic and completely unnecessary
suggestivity in the show-up, and repeated questioning by the police, the
Court determined that the identifications were reliable because the
suspects were rounded up quickly and the detectives did not verbalize
their obvious belief that they had apprehended the culprit.
In Howard v. Bouchard,138 the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that
seeing the defendant in court at the defense table with his counsel about
one hour before the lineup could have unduly infected witnesses’
identifications, terming this lapse only “minimally suggestive.”139
Applying Manson, the court concluded that the identifications were
reliable despite the fact that the eyewitnesses had been passing by in a
moving truck in an area lit by street lamps at the time of the earlymorning shooting, and had seen the shooter only during three intervals
ranging from “a split-second” to “about a minute and a half,” at
distances ranging from three to forty feet.140 The Seventh Circuit reached
this conclusion in part based on the fact that “the eyewitnesses were
participating in a repossession, which by its stressful nature generally
demands heightened attention[,]”141 and based on the witnesses’
subjective expressions of certainty.142

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
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B. State Court Decisions
The Manson rule of decision also produces rote and unconvincing
analysis in state court opinions. An example is State v. Thompson,143 in
which the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed the denial of a
motion to suppress an identification, despite the fact that the police
officer who had transported the witness to the show-up had asked the
witness to make an identification of the person who was “probably the
shooter.”144 The officer told the witness: “‘[W]e believe we have the
person. We need you to identify him.’”145 The police drove the witness
in a police car to the location where the suspect had been
apprehended.146 Training spotlights and headlights on the defendant,
they removed him from the back of the police car for a show-up.147 The
trial court denied the defense motion to suppress, noting that the witness
had a “good, hard look,” the identification occurred less than two hours
after the shooting,148 and the witness was very certain of his
identification.149 On appeal, despite the fact that the state conceded that
the show-up was unnecessarily suggestive,150 the Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the identification was reliable,
citing precedent that, “a good hard look will pass muster even if it occurs
during a fleeting glance.”151 Additionally, the appellate court also noted
that the witness had indicated “a high level of certainty” in his
identification,152 but did not address how the officers’ comments could
have inflated the witness’s subjective assessment of his certainty.
In State v. Johnson,153 an Ohio case, a juvenile murder defendant,
Brandon Johnson, was identified by the decedent’s wife at a “bind-over”
hearing in juvenile court, which effectively transferred the case to the
adult criminal court.154 The witness had failed to identify Mr. Johnson
from a photo array the month following the incident.155 At a bind-over
hearing about seven months later, she pointed out the defendant.156 The
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

839 A.2d 622 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 630 (citing State v. Ledbetter, 441 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1981)) (emphasis omitted).
Id.
836 N.E.2d 1243 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1248.
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Ohio appellate court described the scene: “[The] defendant was dressed
in clothing from the Department of Youth Services and may have been
handcuffed and . . . he was the only young African-American male
seated at the defense table.”157 Not surprisingly, the decedent’s wife
identified him.158 Pointing him out, she said, “Those eyes, those eyes. I
will never forget those eyes.”159 Later, when Mr. Johnson was tried for
the murder in adult court, the government sought to introduce the wife’s
identification, and the defense moved to suppress.160 The trial court
granted the motion to suppress, but the Tenth District of the Court of
Appeals of Ohio reversed.161 The appellate court candidly acknowledged
the suggestive circumstances of the identification at the bind-over
hearing,162 but concluded that, pursuant to Biggers and Manson, the
identification was reliable,163 because the witness had seen the two
gunmen for about “70 to 75 seconds” at the time of the shooting, and that
she said she was within a few feet of the man who shot her husband
“staring at the person who had a gun, his eyes.”164 It did not matter, the
appellate court reasoned, that the witness had earlier failed to pick Mr.
Johnson from a photo array: the juvenile court judge and prosecutor at
the bind-over hearing testified that the witness had been “certain” in her
identification.165
Finally, in a Mississippi case, Bynum v. State,166 Tommy Bynum was
charged with robbery in connection with a purse-snatching. During the
incident, the robber had struggled with the victim in a parking lot before
grabbing her purse.167 The victim testified that the attack lasted several
seconds.168 One week after the attack, the victim was shown a photo
array and picked two people out of it—Mr. Bynum and another
person.169 The victim stated that Mr. Bynum “looked the most like the
attacker.”170 Four days later, the victim was shown a second photo array.
This array contained Mr. Bynum’s picture, but not the photograph of the
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
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other person that the complainant had picked from the first array.171
Predictably, the victim picked Mr. Bynum as the assailant, this time
making the identification “positively and unequivocally.”172 There were
two other eyewitnesses to the purse-snatching. One was unable to pick
the assailant out of a photo array, but later identified Mr. Bynum as the
robber.173 The third identified Mr. Bynum from a photo line-up and
testified that he was “100% certain.”174 The defense moved to suppress
all three eyewitness identifications, but the trial court concluded that
“the cumulative testimony of the three eyewitnesses identified Bynum”
as the robber.175 In a conclusory paragraph, the Court of Appeals of
Mississippi applied the Biggers factors and affirmed denial of the motion
to suppress,176 without addressing whether it was problematic for the
trial court to consider the three witnesses’ identifications “cumulatively,”
in determining whether each identification was reliable.
Of course, not all courts are blind to Manson’s potential failings when
that rule is applied reflexively and without any meaningful
consideration of the actual reliability of the identification. Some lower
courts recognize the weaknesses of the Manson test, but nonetheless feel
bound by precedent to apply it.177 Others conclude that the psychological
research provides reason to apply Manson carefully,178 and demand rigor
in its application.179 Still others have rejected or refined the Manson test
as a matter of state law,180 or mandated rules pursuant to their
supervisory authority.181 Unfortunately, many other lower courts
continue to apply Manson mechanically, in a manner that undermines
the values of “fairness” and “reliability.”
Again, the point here is not that the cases discussed in this section
allowed mistaken identifications into evidence. To our knowledge, the
defendants in these cases have not been exonerated, and we do not know
Id.
Id.
173
Id. at 330.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
See, e.g., State v. Chance, No. A04-948, 2005 WL 1668890, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 19,
2005). “Although it is true that recent research casts substantial doubt over the relationship
between witness confidence and witness accuracy, any change in established precedent
must be left to the supreme court.” Id.
178
See, e.g., Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184 (Colo. 2002) (discussing psychological research
and remanding for a more complete evidentiary hearing).
179
See, e.g., Brisco v. Phillips, 376 F. Supp. 2d 306, 319-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
180
See supra notes 44-47 (providing constitutional state decisions rejecting Manson).
181
See supra notes 48-51 (providing decisions under state courts’ supervisory authority).
171
172
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whether any of these individuals have credible claims of actual
innocence. The facts recited in these appellate decisions, however,
provided substantial indications both of unnecessarily suggestive police
procedures and potential unreliability of the identifications—indications
that courts applying the Manson test completely ignored in their analysis.
The purpose in describing these lower court decisions, then, is merely to
illustrate that the rule of decision announced by Manson produces a type
of analysis that is not a good fit for the constitutional operative
propositions of fairness and reliability. In many instances in the
reported decisions, courts merely search the record for any evidence of
the five Manson reliability factors, list them, and conclude summarily
that the identification was nonetheless reliable. Although such opinions
are easy to lampoon, the problem is not just that courts are issuing
poorly-reasoned decisions. After all, it is legitimately difficult to make
case-by-case reliability determinations in an area as subtle as eyewitness
identifications, and the Manson factors provide courts with a heuristic.
The problem is that the Manson heuristic is not a good tool for achieving
the stated goal of reliability.
V. TOWARDS A NEW RULE OF DECISION
This Article describes a problem in the world, a problem in the law,
and the beginnings of a proposed solution. The problem in the world is
complicated and somewhat intractable. Human perception and memory
are imperfect in nature, but despite their flawed characters, they provide
evidence that is necessarily the basis of many criminal prosecutions. The
problem in the law is that the Manson rule of decision was poorly
constructed for its task, and has, in Professor Roosevelt’s terms, “lost fit”
in light of the developments in social science.182 The tough part, of
course, is the third task—coming up with a proposed rule of decision to
replace Manson. Although we do not offer a comprehensive scheme, we
hope to spark discussion by advocating a decision rule for federal due
process challenges that includes some minimal affirmative guidelines for
conducting identification procedures.
A. Why Due Process Challenges to Identification Procedures Matter
Not surprisingly, there are a number of ways to address the problem
of faulty eyewitness identifications, besides suppressing evidence of outof-court identification procedures through due process challenges.
Many experts working in the field have focused their energies at an
182
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earlier point in the criminal justice process, attempting to stop erroneous
identifications from being made through reforms in identification
procedures.183 Other advocates have focused instead on curative
measures at trial. Some have promoted admitting expert testimony on
eyewitness identification to educate jurors about its problems.184 Still
others have counseled better jury instructions on the potential problems
of eyewitness identification.185
We believe that although such measures are helpful and even
necessary, they do not alleviate the need to revisit Manson and its rule of
decision. The strategy of going to the source by improving police
procedures is clearly an important one, but it will take time. To date,
only a few jurisdictions have instituted wholesale reforms.186 The system
cannot wait for reforms to eyewitness identification procedures to stem
the tide of faulty identifications. Moreover, reforms of law enforcement
practices will not address the problem of the decades of cases that are
already in the pipeline.
Many curative measures at trial—such as instructions on eyewitness
identification or expert testimony—allow suspect eyewitness
identifications to go to the jury, where their persuasive effect may
outweigh their reliability. Most importantly, it is simply not feasible to
admit an expert in every routine robbery case, particularly given the
reality of serious funding limitations in indigent defense systems around
the country.187 As Professor Wells has pointed out, there are probably
fewer than fifty well-qualified eyewitness identification experts and over
77,000 eyewitness identification cases per year in the U.S.188
As for jury instructions, although the law must rely on the
assumption that jurors follow them,189 their actual efficacy is debatable.
As Justice Scalia has candidly acknowledged, “The rule that juries are
183
Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 37; Wells, Systematic Reforms,
supra note 54.
184
See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of
Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013 (1995); Michael Leippe, The Case for Expert
Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 909-59 (1995); Edward
Stein, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness
Identification, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 295 (2003).
185
Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence, supra note 32, at 20.
186
See supra note 54.
187
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE—A REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
7 (2005).
188
Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence, supra note 32, at 19.
189
See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
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presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in
the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that
it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the
state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.”190 Studies of
juror instructions on eyewitness identification indicate that they are not
an effective safeguard against wrongful conviction.191
Many observers, including the Supreme Court in Watkins, suggest
that cross-examination alone can uncover unreliable identifications.192
This approach ignores the unique power and danger of eyewitness
identification testimony. The persuasive effect of eyewitness
identification testimony has been remarked upon by lawyers and
commentators for decades. In his dissent in Watkins, Justice Brennan
explained that he believed that jurors should know nothing about
eyewitness identifications subject to suppression because of “[t]he
powerful impact that much eyewitness identification evidence has on
juries.”193 Justice Brennan quoted Professor Elizabeth Loftus’s seminal
work, Eyewitness Testimony: “All the evidence points rather strikingly to
the conclusion that there is almost nothing more convincing than a live
human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and
says, ‘That’s the one!’”194
Subsequent scientific research has further confirmed that Justice
Brennan’s concerns were well-founded. Jurors have a poor
understanding of factors that can undermine the reliability of eyewitness
identification.195 Even more troubling, jurors tend to “over-believe”
eyewitnesses. Studies demonstrate that jurors have difficulty
distinguishing accurate from inaccurate witnesses. In one study, mock
jurors believed 62% of eyewitnesses witnessing in poor conditions, when
only 33% of such witnesses were in fact accurate.196 In another study,
eyewitness confidence was a better predictor of conviction by mock
jurors than eyewitness accuracy.197 In that study, eyewitnesses who
Id.
Penrod & Cutler, supra note 76, at 834.
192
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981) (describing “the time-honored process of
cross-examination as the device best suited to determine the trustworthiness of testimonial
evidence”).
193
Id. at 352-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194
Id. at 353 (quoting ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)).
195
See generally Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding
of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177 (2006).
196
Penrod & Cutler, supra note 76, at 820.
197
R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Fergus J. O’Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and
Inaccurate Eyewitnesses, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 337 (1989).
190
191
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identified an innocent suspect convinced 70% of mock jurors to convict,
while eyewitnesses who identified a guilty party produced only a 68%
rate of conviction.198 In short, jurors believe eyewitnesses, even when
they are wrong, and find eyewitness identification testimony so
persuasive that it may well color their view of all of the other evidence in
the case.
Finally, because the use of suggestive procedures and unreliable
identifications almost always occur with eyewitnesses who honestly
believe their own mistaken identification, cross-examination is nearly
useless. A certain-but-wrong witness will have the demeanor of a truthteller and will not be shaken by confrontation. A paradigmatic example
of this type of witness is Jennifer Thompson, the courageous woman
who honestly but mistakenly identified Ronald Cotton as the man who
raped her, and, after his DNA exoneration eleven years later, came
forward to say publicly and repeatedly, “I was certain, but I was
wrong.”199 Research has shown that mistaken witnesses will not only
genuinely believe in their own identification, but will also now honestly
remember the circumstances of their identification as being more
favorable than they truly were.200 Such witnesses cannot be easily
impeached through a demonstration of objective unreliability, given that
jurors often do not understand what factors make one seeminglyconvincing identification more reliable than another, and given that
expert testimony (even where admissible) is impractical to present on a
routine basis.
For these reasons, we argue that suppression of out-of-court
identification procedures that were rendered unreliable by unduly
suggestive police procedures remains an important part of the solution
to the problem of faulty identifications.201 And as a result, a new rule of
decision is required to replace the outmoded Manson test. But what form
should this new rule take?

Id. at 336.
Thompson, supra note 20.
200
See supra notes 78-79.
201
While DNA exonerees have tried to bring civil rights lawsuits alleging constitutional
violations arising from faulty eyewitness identification procedures, some courts have
concluded that suppression is the only remedy. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rollins, No. 4:04
CV967-SNL, 2006 WL 2546807 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2006).
198
199
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B. How To Construct a New Rule of Decision To Replace Manson
The first and most obvious step in constructing a new rule of
decision is to disavow the Manson reliability checklist. The reliability
factors are not only discredited, they also are poorly suited to the task of
ensuring fairness and reliability in out-of-court identifications. Indeed,
the Manson reliability factors have functioned in such a way as to create
safe harbor provisions, but not ones that, to borrow Professor Susan
Klein’s terms “instrumentally advance” Due Process Clause values or
“offer[ ] bright-line guidance for officers in the field.”202 All too often, if
a police officer, prosecutor, or trial court elicits a subjective statement of
confidence from a witness, or a subjective statement that the witness got
a “good look,” the identification will be deemed reliable and admitted.
Thus, the Manson checklist creates an incentive to elicit a statement of
confidence, but not necessarily to use procedures that are reliable.
Moreover, rote application of factors such as certainty that are
acknowledged by social science to be only weakly correlated with
reliability undermines respect for the courts. As the DNA exonerations
have now demonstrated, Manson routinely allows the juries to consider
mistaken eyewitness testimony thus failing in its avowed purpose of
preventing wrongful convictions based on this testimony. It is time for
Manson to go.
The more difficult question—and the one worthy of discussion—is
what should replace the Manson rule. Professor Klein has argued that
eyewitness identification is a “prime candidate” for “new prophylactic
. . . procedures to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial in light of the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony.”203 Acknowledging the social
science research about the problems of human memory and the weak
confidence-accuracy correlation, and pointing to the fact that “studies
have shown misidentification to be one of the most frequent causes of
the conviction of the innocent[,]” Professor Klein concludes, “The best
candidate for countering these injustices is a new rule . . . that would
require proper procedures and guidelines for lineups, show-ups, and
photo arrays.”204
Although we agree in large measure, we must recognize at the outset
that this route was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in
Manson. In his Manson concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote, “the

202
203
204
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arguments in favor of fashioning new rules to minimize the danger of
convicting the innocent on the basis of unreliable eyewitness testimony
carry substantial force.”205 “Nevertheless,” he concluded, “I am
persuaded that this rulemaking function can be performed ‘more
effectively by the legislative process than by a somewhat clumsy judicial
fiat,’ and that the Federal Constitution does not foreclose
experimentation by the States in the development of such rules.”206
But it must be remembered that the Manson debate occurred in a
different time and under different circumstances than the current debate
over the proper role of eyewitness identification testimony in the judicial
system. The social science has evolved and changed dramatically, as we
have pointed out elsewhere in this Article. In addition, the Manson
Court did not have thirty years worth of evidence demonstrating that a
reliability test would be completely ineffective in protecting the judicial
system from the dangers of mistaken eyewitness testimony. We now
know to a certainty, however, that such convictions have occurred fairly
routinely and that Manson has done nothing to prevent them. In fact,
because jurors tend to over-value eyewitness identification testimony,
Manson may have affirmatively contributed to the conviction of the
innocent.207
Moreover, the criminal justice landscape itself has changed
dramatically since Manson. Indeed, as recently as 1995, just before the
explosion of DNA exonerations become known, the Supreme Court
described meritorious innocence claims as “extremely rare.” 208 In the
past decade, however, literally hundreds of DNA exonerations have
provided irrefutable evidence that wrongful convictions are far less
“rare” than anyone—including advocates for the innocent—ever
imagined. Thus, although Justice Stevens’s cautious attitude toward
limitations on the use of eyewitness evidence was certainly warranted
based on what was known in 1977, it is impossible to justify similar
caution today—when we know both that the Manson approach has failed
and that substantial agreement has arisen in the social science
community over the efficacy of certain police procedures in the
eyewitness context.

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 117-18 (citations omitted).
207
Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, Confidence, and Decision
Times in Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 22, 23 (1993). See also
Perez v. United States, No. 05-0596, 2005 WL 3038542, at *8-*9 (Nov. 10, 2005).
208
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995).
205
206
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In light of this emerging consensus, the Court should adopt a
decision rule that institutes minimum affirmative guidelines for the
conduct of identification procedures. These guidelines would be selected
to address major issues affecting the structural integrity of the
procedures—not to dictate every step. Identifications that run afoul of
the minimum guidelines would be excluded. However, courts also
would remain free in extraordinary cases to exclude identifications that
are the products of procedures that, while complying with the minimum
guidelines, are nonetheless so suggestive as to render the identification
unreliable.
The single most important guideline would be the implementation
of double-blind procedures, “in which the administrator is not in a
position to unintentionally influence the witness’s selection.”209 A report
by the National Institute of Justice in 1999 explained that “investigators’
unintentional cues (e.g., body language, tone of voice) may negatively
impact the reliability of eyewitness evidence,” and that “such influences
could be avoided if ‘blind’ identification procedures were employed.”210
For this reason, double blind procedures are a fundamental part of
scientific and social science research.211 If double-blind procedures are
used, they will automatically eliminate a number of problems that the
social science research has documented, including the experimenterexpectancy effect and the problem of confirming feedback.212 Such
protections may be even more important in the context of a criminal
investigation, because, as Professors Findley and Scott have recently
described in their article on the problem of tunnel vision, police and
other investigators are under tremendous pressure to close criminal
cases and remove violent criminals from the streets.213
Other fundamental affirmative guidelines for any such rule of
decision could track the recommendations of the Eyewitness Evidence
WISCONSIN DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF TRAINING AND STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 3 (2005), available
at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf [hereinafter MODEL POLICY
AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION].
210
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 53. Although recognizing the value of double-blind procedures,
the NIJ report did not recommend them at that time because of the difficulties in
implementation. Id.
211
Robert Rosenthal, Experimenter and Clinician Effects in Scientific Inquiry and Clinical
Practice, PREVENTION & TREATMENT, Oct. 2002, at 1-12; Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, supra note 37, at 627-28.
212
See supra note 210.
213
Findley & Scott, supra note 39, at 323-37.
209
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Guide for Law Enforcement of the National Institute of Justice of the United
States Department of Justice,214 the 2004 American Bar Association report
on eyewitness testimony,215 or the Model Policy and Procedure for
Eyewitness Evidence recently adopted by the State of Wisconsin.216
Professor Taslitz has advocated the adoption of a number of measures
recommended in the ABA report, practices “so strongly supported by
the scientific research and so essential to avoiding mistaken
identifications that ignoring any one of these requirements should
presumptively constitute a due process violation.”217
Obviously, “non-suspect fillers [should be] chosen to minimize any
suggestiveness that might point toward the suspect.”218
Law
enforcement should “[s]eparate witnesses and instruct them to avoid
discussing details of the incident with other witnesses.”219 In addition,
law enforcement should “[a]void multiple identification procedures in
which the same witness views the same suspect more than once.”220
Officers also should caution witnesses prior to viewing a photo array or
line-up, with instructions that track those suggested by the DOJ,
informing them that: (1) “it is just as important to clear innocent persons
from suspicion as to identify guilty parties”; (2) “individuals present in
the lineup may not appear exactly as they did on the date of the
incident”; (3) “the person who committed the crime may or may not be
present in the group of individuals”; and (4) “regardless of whether an
identification is made, the police will continue to investigate the
incident.”221 Finally, each witness should be asked to make a statement
of how certain she is of her pick immediately after making the
identification, in order to avoid the distorting effects of postidentification feedback.222

NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 53; NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 53.
215
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT IN SUPPORT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION
RESOLUTION ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership.2004/annual/dailyjournal/111c.doc [hereinafter RESOLUTION ON EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY].
216
MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 209.
217
Andrew Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process After
Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST. 39, 53 (2005).
218
MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 209, at 3.
219
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra
note 53, at 27.
220
MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 209, at 3.
221
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 53, at 40.
222
MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 209.
214

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 2

140

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The proposed solution of affirmative minimum guidelines for lineups and photo arrays helps to address the problem in the real world. A
decision rule with affirmative guidelines provides clear guidance to law
enforcement, and possesses significant deterrence value. Affirmative
guidelines are not equivalent to, and, indeed, are far superior to, the per
se exclusion rule advocated by the prisoner and dissenters in Manson.223
While a per se exclusionary rule would penalize police for procedures
deemed after the fact to be impermissibly suggestive—forcing police to
guess about what is allowed—affirmative guidelines provide true ex ante
guidance. This is the same benefit as the Miranda rule: clear, simple
guidelines that are relatively simple for the police to integrate into their
work.224 While police might engage in gamesmanship to circumvent the
rules, with clear guidelines, courts are able to clamp down on such
practices, as the Supreme Court did recently in condemning “questionfirst” practices that undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda
warning.225
Moreover, while many exclusionary rules restrict the availability of
otherwise reliable evidence, our proposed decision rule excludes only
evidence for which the government has foregone easily available means
of ensuring reliability. Thus, it has the added benefit of aiding the truthseeking process. Put differently, our rule could reduce the number of
mistaken identifications. For example, police would not have shown
Ronald Cotton’s photo to Jennifer Thompson before asking her to make a
pick from a live lineup in which he participated.226 They would not have
instructed her to choose the man who looked the most like her
assailant.227 Ms. Thompson would have been asked to state her
subjective level of certainty at the time she made her identification, so
that it was not inflated later by repeated questioning, the effects of trial
preparation, or confirming feedback from police or prosecutors.
Although we will never know for sure, these measures could have
helped to avert the wrongful conviction of Ronald Cotton, obviously
benefiting Mr. Cotton, saving Ms. Thompson much anguish, and
protecting the community from Bobby Poole.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 128 (1977) (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 56, at 759 (discussing studies that suggest “that the
Miranda procedures are effective . . . in assuring the accused an opportunity to exercise
their right of silence”).
225
See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609-17 (2004) (concluding that “questionfirst” tactics rendered Miranda warnings functionally ineffective and thus warranted
suppression of confession).
226
State v. Cotton, 394 S.E.2d 456, 461 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
227
Id.
223
224
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The proposed decision rule also addresses the problem in the law.
Any decision rule that is adopted will sometimes exclude reliable
identifications, or admit unreliable identifications.228 A rule with
proposed affirmative guidelines, however, would be easier for courts to
administer than the Manson test. It would also put the focus where it
should be—on unnecessarily suggestive police procedures—rather than
on attempting to discern whether an identification is, in fact, reliable.
This type of determination is better-suited to courts’ institutional
competence, and the resulting analysis would be a better fit to the
constitutional operative propositions of the Due Process Clause—
fairness and reliability.
An example helps to illustrate the benefits of our proposed rule of
decision. In Wong, the Green Dragon gang member case, rather than
struggling to determine whether a witness’s fleeting glimpse of a
gunman was reliable, the court would have had clear direction to
exclude the identification when it learned that the detectives had
pressured her to make an identification, saying, “we can’t just take a
‘possibly.’”229 Conversely, a court that knew that detectives had adhered
scrupulously to the minimum guidelines would not have been forced to
become mired in details about the witness’s view of the gunman,
subjective level of certainty, etc. The court could have been certain both
that it was applying a clear rule correctly, and that the use of the
guideline procedures would have reduced the likelihood of an actual
mistake.
The affirmative guidelines set out by the Court under our proposed
rule of decision would be the minimum requirements for identification
procedures, not necessarily co-extensive with the requirements of due
process. In Professor Lawrence Sager’s terms, the federal constitutional
rule of decision would “under-enforce” due process.230 Professor
Monaghan and others have suggested that prophylactic rules such as
those set out in Miranda over-enforce constitutional norms mandating
more than the Constitution requires.231 On the other hand, the proposed
decision rule is interstitial, and does not attempt to catalogue all of the
ways in which an identification procedure might be so unnecessarily
suggestive as to violate due process. Conversely, we do not pretend to
See generally Roosevelt, supra note 3.
United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1358 (2d Cir. 1994).
230
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
231
Monaghan, supra note 97, at 22-23. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1302-04 (discussing
Monaghan).
228
229
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imagine all of the reforms that might reduce the likelihood of false
identification. Other branches of the federal government, state and local
governments, and various law enforcement agencies would remain free
to enact more detailed or protective rules for conducting identification
procedures, as Justice Stevens suggested in his Manson concurrence.232
Professor Klein has explained that this type of approach “allows the
Court to change the rules by accepting alternate rules provided by
Congress, state legislators, federal and state law enforcement agencies
and state judges, who may have better knowledge of the circumstances
encountered or facts on the ground, and who may be better
institutionally-suited to playing factfinder.”233
Certainly, there are useful measures that local jurisdictions might
choose to implement that are not included on the list. For example,
Wisconsin has chosen to implement sequential line-up rules, because
most research demonstrates that the sequential line-up format—in which
the suspect and fillers are presented one at a time instead of
simultaneously—reduces the relative judgment problem.234
Local
jurisdictions also may choose to require videotaping of identification

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118-19 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Klein, supra note 57, at 1060.
234
MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 209. Early
studies of implementation of sequential double-blind line-up procedures have produced
promising results. Anecdotal reports from New Jersey, Boston, and other jurisdictions
seem to indicate that most jurisdictions using sequential procedures are pleased with the
results. One forthcoming study of the Hennepin County, Minnesota experience with
sequential double-blind procedures suggests that such procedures work satisfactorily and
as predicted by laboratory studies. See Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay &
Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind
Sequential Lineup Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381 (2006). A well-publicized
report of an Illinois pilot project, however, suggested, that sequential double-blind
procedures actually produced a higher rate of known false negatives than the simultaneous
procedures currently used by the police. See REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.chicagopolice.org/IL%20Pilot%20on%20
Eyewitness%20ID.pdf. But the Illinois report has been widely criticized because of the
manner in which it was conducted: there was no protocol for the conduct of the
simultaneous line-ups, and they were not double-blind. Kate Zernike, Questions Raised
Over New Trend in Police Lineups, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at A1. Thus, it is impossible to
compare the performance of the simultaneous and sequential procedures based on the
Illinois report alone. Id. Criticisms of the Illinois project and data from the forthcoming
Hennepin study are summarized in a hand-out by Dr. Nancy Steblay. Nancy Steblay,
Observations on the Illinois Lineup Data, http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/
gwells/Steblay_Observations_on_the_Illinois_Data.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2006). This
area is ripe for additional field research, particularly after researchers design a set of
protocols that can avoid some of the problems in the Illinois study.
232
233

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/2

O'Toole and Shay: Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision f

2006]

Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited

143

procedures, as the American Bar Association study recommended.235
Videotaping would enable defense counsel, the court, and fact-finders to
assess the fairness of these procedures and the witness’s apparent level
of certainty at the time the witness made his or her pick, before the
distorting effects of any type of post-identification feedback. While these
two measures may be extremely worthwhile and reduce the number of
faulty identifications, the list of fundamental affirmative guidelines does
not include them because they are more resource-intensive, more
difficult to implement, and not as fundamental to the overall integrity of
the identification process.
The proposed affirmative guidelines would apply to identification
line-ups and photo arrays. “Show-up” procedures, in which a single
suspect is displayed to the witness, usually shortly after the offense,
obviously raise suggestivity concerns as well. However, without data
about how often show-ups conducted close in time to an incident clear
innocent suspects, we are reluctant to call for a complete ban. And
hopefully technology will soon progress to the point where police with
laptops and digital cameras can construct photo arrays in their squad
cars. For the time being, however, a version of the Stovall or Dubose rules
should be used for show-ups.
In Stovall, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he practice of
showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and
not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned,” but nonetheless
concluded that the confrontation in the witness’s hospital room was
“imperative,” given that the witness might not have lived long enough
to make another identification.236 Unfortunately, as discussed in Part III,
in Simmons, Biggers, and Manson, the Supreme Court turned the focus
from the necessity of using the challenged procedure to the overall
reliability of the witness’s identification. Subsequently, commentators
have urged that the Stovall rule be resurrected with respect to showups.237 In a 2005 show-up case, Wisconsin v. Dubose, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court announced that “evidence obtained from an out-of-court
showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless, based
on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary.”238

RESOLUTION ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, supra note 215.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
237
Jessica Lee, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects from Consequences of
Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 755 (2005).
238
State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593-94 (Wis. 2005).
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In applying a Stovall-Dubose rule to show-ups, courts should make
clear that they must be conducted soon after the incident: research has
demonstrated that witnesses’ show-up identifications become markedly
less reliable twenty-four hours after a crime.239 In addition, although a
Stovall-Dubose rule would allow imperative or exigent show-ups, the
Dubose Court has said that it does not permit other types of suggestivity
commonly seen in show-up cases—the presence of handcuffs or squad
cars, for example.240
C. Potential Criticisms of a Rule of Decision Based on Affirmative Guidelines
A number of potential criticisms of the proposed rule of decision can
be anticipated. Some will object to the proposal because they doubt the
legitimacy of prophylactic rules generally. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to mount a full-scale defense of the legitimacy of so-called
prophylactic rules. But those rules have a substantial pedigree in
American jurisprudence, which is why a variety of legal scholars have
continued to defend their use. Legal scholars beginning with Professor
David Strauss have defended prophylactic rules by questioning the
subdivision of types of constitutional interpretation, arguing that
“[c]onstitutional law is filled with rules that are justified in ways that are
analytically indistinguishable from the justifications for the Miranda
rules.”241 More recently, but in a similar vein, Professor Daryl Levinson
has criticized “rights essentialism,” arguing that “[r]ights are dependent
on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their
scope, shape, and very existence.”242
Although prophylactic rules have been called into question by some
commentators,243 and criticized by some Supreme Court justices in the
Miranda context,244 the Court has continued to utilize such rules in
appropriate cases. Indeed, Professor Roosevelt has pointed out that the
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice
Scalia, has adopted such an approach to the procedure for appointed
appellate counsel for indigents who conclude that an appeal is frivolous
and move to withdraw.245 The Court set out a procedure for such
Lee, supra note 237, at 770. See A.D. Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications
in Show-ups and Lineup, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 464 (1996).
240
Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 594.
241
Strauss, supra note 59, at 195.
242
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857,
858-59 (1999).
243
See Grano, supra note 97.
244
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 450 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1671.
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lawyers to follow in Anders v. California,246 but, in Smith v. Robbins, the
Court made clear that the Anders procedure was “a prophylactic one,”
and that “the States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as
those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant’s right to appellate
counsel.”247
Having employed Professor Berman’s lexicon of “constitutional
operative propositions” and “decision rules” throughout this Article, we
are in some sense what Professor Berman might describe as
“taxonomists”—that is, we find labels to be helpful in discussing
different types of constitutional interpretation.248
But, while a
willingness to use labels has often been associated with criticism of
prophylactic rules,249 there is no meaningful difference between so-called
prophylactic rules and other forms of judicial remedies. As Professor
Roosevelt has argued, decision rules may or may not closely track
operative constitutional provisions; they may over-enforce or underenforce, depending on issues including (as catalogued by Professor
Roosevelt): institutional competence, costs of error, frequency of
unconstitutional action, legislative pathologies, enforcement costs, and
the need for guidance for other government actors.250 Professor Fallon
has used the term “judicially manageable standards” to describe the tests
that the Court crafts, which he says are distinct from the “constitutional
norms” themselves.251 In other words, so-called prophylactic rules are
just another type of decision rule or judicially manageable standard, and
such rules are common in constitutional adjudication.252
Adopting an affirmative statement of procedures as a decision rule
can lessen the adjudicative burden on the lower courts. Professor
Strauss has explained that the Supreme Court adopted the Miranda rule
of decision because “a case-by-case review . . . was severely testing its
capacities, and those of the lower courts.”253 Professor Roosevelt
concurs: “the voluntariness determination was difficult for courts to
make on the basis of a paper record that might reveal very little about
the actual tone and tenor of an interrogation.”254 This rationale holds
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000). See Klein, supra note 57, at 1042-43; Roosevelt, supra note 3, at
1671.
248
Berman, supra note 3, at 9.
249
See generally Grano, supra note 97.
250
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1659-67.
251
Fallon, supra note 3, at 1277-78.
252
Berman, supra note 3, at 61.
253
Strauss, supra note 59, at 208-09.
254
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1672.
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true in the context of eyewitness identification procedures as well. Just
as a case-by-case determination of voluntariness strained the courts in
the coerced confessions cases, case-by-case determinations of reliability
impose burdens on the lower courts. Professor Andrew Taslitz has
argued that “freestanding due process has often generated specific
doctrines too weak to serve the goal of truth-seeking,” in particular
choosing “flexible utilitarian balancing tests” over clear rules.255 Indeed,
one way of understanding the rote application of the Manson reliability
factors is as a reaction to a task that is very difficult, resource-intensive,
and not suited to the tool that has been provided.
Other advocates and commentators may criticize the proposed rule
of decision for a different reason—arguing that the Court should either
adopt a per se rule of exclusion or broaden the Dubose rule beyond the
show-up context, to exclude unnecessarily suggestive line-ups and photo
arrays that were not necessary under the circumstances.256 Professor
Keith Findley of the University of Wisconsin, amicus in Dubose, would
argue that an advantage of the Dubose rule of decision is that it can be
revised easily in light of emerging social science. Rather than
incorporating the current social science literature directly into the
constitutional rule of decision, it places the responsibility on the defense
bar to keep abreast of the developments in the research and argue that
outdated procedures are unnecessarily suggestive.257
There are many good things about the Dubose rule. It is certainly
preferable to Manson, and, in fact, as discussed above, a Dubose rule for
show-ups should be used. Nonetheless, prophylactic rules for line-ups
and photo arrays possess a number of advantages. First, they provide ex
ante guidance to the police, which will reduce the number of mistaken
identifications and relieve courts of making after-the-fact assessments of
whether the police procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. Second,
they provide structure for trial courts’ assessments, so that they do not
devolve into the type of rote and mechanistic analysis described in Part
IV. The Dubose rule shifts the focus from the reliability to the
suggestivity prong of Manson. In the context of show-ups, the analysis is
straightforward: a show-up is easy to identify, and the Dubose Court
said that show-ups are “inherently suggestive.”258 However, the
Taslitz, supra note 217, at 48.
See supra notes 40-43.
257
Wisconsin v. Hibl, 714 N.W.2d 194 (2006); University of Wisconsin Law School, NonParty Brief of the Wisconsin Innocence Project of the Frank J. Remington Center 8 (2005), available
at http://www.law.wisc.edu/webshare/02i6/dubose.pdf.
258
State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593-94 (Wis. 2005).
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suggestivity determination for line-ups and photo arrays is less clear-cut
(for example, does the background or the lighting draw attention to the
suspect?). Under Manson, trial courts currently issue at least as many
superficial suggestivity analyses as reliability determinations, albeit
some of the most egregious are in the show-up context.259 We fear that a
per se exclusion or Dubose rule for photo arrays and line-ups would
generate even more empty suggestivity decisions.
Perhaps the most significant argument against our proposal for
prophylactic rules is that affirmative guidelines based on the social
science at the time of their adoption will not keep pace with new
research findings. The response is that the prophylactic rules proposed
are not intended to dictate an elaborate set of procedures, but rather to
set a minimum floor based on fundamental safeguards. The affirmative
guidelines advocated—such as double-blind procedures—are nearly
universally accepted among the research community. Improved
eyewitness identification procedures that remain the subject of research
and debate—for example sequential identification procedures—could be
adopted by state and local governments but would not be mandated by
the prophylactic rules we advance.
Even if the Supreme Court is reluctant to adopt a decision rule for
federal due process challenges that includes affirmative guidelines for
identification procedures, it should adopt such rules for identification
procedures in the federal system as a matter of its supervisory
authority,260 as the New Jersey Supreme Court did in Delgado.261 In
Dickerson, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it possesses
259
See, e.g., Hartridge v. United States, 896 A.2d 198, 223 (D.C. 2006) (finding that the
identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive when police showed homicide
witness a stack of photographs in which the defendant was the only person pictured that
she did not know); Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that
the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive when defendant was “the only
African-American” and “presented for identification in handcuffs standing between two
police officers at the edge of a line of police cars”); People v. Delarosa, 813 N.Y.S.2d 610
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“The fact that defendant was in handcuffs standing next to a police
officer when viewed by the witnesses does not render the procedure unduly suggestive as
a matter of law.”); People v. Clark, 810 N.Y.S. 2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (same as
Delarosa); People v. Gil, 803 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (finding that the fact that
defendant was handcuffed and that witness was told that police had a suspect in custody
did not render show-up unduly suggestive).
260
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000). See, e.g., Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1943) (exercising
supervisory authority to exclude defendant’s confession obtained during unlawful
detention).
261
State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 897, 888 (N.J. 2006).
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supervisory authority over the federal courts, and that it “may use that
authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding
in those tribunals.”262 Implementing eyewitness identification
procedures under the Court’s supervisory authority would not only
improve the quality of adjudication in the federal system, but also would
promote further debate about how to guard against faulty
identifications. This is a worthy goal in and of itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of faulty eyewitness identifications is an enduring one,
which probably will remain with us as long as human beings witness
crimes. Nonetheless, we must confront the problem and remedy what
we can, given the current state of the science. Much is at stake: the lives
of the wrongly accused like Ronald Cotton; the peace-of-mind of honest
but mistaken victims like Jennifer Thompson; and the safety of
communities in which true offenders remain on the street while the
wrongfully convicted languish behind bars. Even more fundamentally,
the legitimacy of our criminal justice system is shaken when an
unreliable identification is admitted, particularly one that is the product
of suggestive police procedures.
The Manson test erodes the integrity of the system not only because,
like other elements of criminal procedure, it sometimes gets cases wrong.
At an even more fundamental level, applying a decision rule that has not
kept pace with the science, and that invites rote analysis, threatens the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. No one benefits when some of
the most significant decisions in criminal prosecutions are made based
on meaningless formalisms.
It is time to revisit Manson. We hope that this Article will contribute
to serious debate about how best to construct a decision rule to replace
Manson, and about whether minimum affirmative guidelines for
identification procedures can play a role in that project.
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